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Pro se litigation is a daunting task for anyone, let alone an 
uneducated or indigent party who cannot afford representation. As of 
2015, a criminal defendant has the right to counsel, but a civil party 
has no similar right.
1
 In a survey of federal cases in 2009, the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals heard 27,905 cases of pro se litigants—“a surprising 
48%” of the total number of cases heard in the courts that year.
2
 It is 
also possible that uneducated or indigent appellants are represented by 
ineffective or incompetent counsel. This leads to the question: how 
does the court system reconcile a large number of cases being 
ineffectively handled (through no fault of the party) with the notions 
of justice? 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2016, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1
 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
2
 Michael Correll, Finding the Limits of Equitable Liberality: Reconsidering 
the Liberal Construction of Pro Se Appellate Briefs, 35 VT. L. REV. 863, 871 (2011). 
1
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Technology may provide an answer. Since the proliferation of the 
home computer and Internet access, laypeople can access a vast 
amount of specialized information from their home. Similarly, 
“[t]echnology in litigation has changed enormously since the adoption 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.”
3
 The stereotype of Internet 
research is that it is completely unreliable, but much information 
available on the Internet is credible and can be a great resource in the 
right hands.
4
 The urge for trial courts, juries, and even appellate courts 
to simply “google”
5
 an aspect of the case is very tempting. Developing 
standards for a court’s use of this type of Internet search is critical in 
both limiting a court’s desire to impermissibly search outside of the 
record as well as providing a stepping-stone to assist pro se or indigent 
litigants who are getting lost in the system due to insufficient 
pleadings and evidence. 
In the recent Seventh Circuit decision Rowe v. Gibson, Judge 
Posner relied on Internet research to reverse a district court’s finding 
of summary judgment against a pro se prisoner litigant.
6
 This article 
will discuss the controversial choices that Judge Posner made and will 
develop a framework to allow courts to adopt Internet research in the 
courtroom. By supplementing current judicial practices regarding pro 
se litigants with careful Internet research, courts may ensure that pro 
se litigants have the greatest access to justice. 
Part I of this article examines the history of the record, case law 
surrounding the notion that an appellate court must not look outside of 
the record in making its determination, as well as the increasing use of 
technology in the courtroom. This section provides a backdrop to 
                                                 
3
 Verizon Directories Corp. v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 136, 
142 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
4
 See Internet Accuracy: Is Information on the Web Reliable? 18 CQ 
RESEARCHER 625, 630 (2008) (noting that Internet sources do not lie more than 
people “in real life” and Internet sources are not necessarily more biased than other 
information sources). 
5
 Google (v): to “enter (a search term) into the Google search engine to find 
information on the Internet; to search for information about (a person or thing) in 
this way.” Google, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006). 
6
 Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F. 3d 622 (7th Cir. 2015). 
2
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Rowe v. Gibson and potential further uses of technology in the 
courtroom. Part II examines the recent Seventh Circuit decision Rowe 
v. Gibson and analyzes Judge Posner’s majority opinion, Judge 
Rovner’s concurrence, and Judge Hamilton’s dissent. Part III develops 
a test using current appellate practices regarding pro se litigants in 
order to adopt Internet research into these current practices. Part IV 
applies this test to the methodology of Rowe v. Gibson and evaluates 
Judge Posner’s use of Internet research in this case. That part 
concludes that while Judge Posner was correct in using Internet 
research in this situation, the kinds of websites he consulted varied too 
greatly. For Internet research to be a viable tool in a courtroom, the 
research must meet minimum standards of accuracy and reliability.  
 
BACKGROUND & HISTORY OF THE RECORD, JUDICIAL NOTICE, AND 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
 
It is generally accepted that a court cannot expand the record on 
appeal with materials that were not presented to the trial court. 
“Appellate courts have two primary institutional objectives: to develop 
the law in a particular area as guidance for future cases and to rectify 
egregious errors in discrete cases.”
7
 In order to best effectuate this 
goal, the appellate court must examine the entire record of the trial 
court to determine for itself if (after determining the correct standard 
of review) the trial court decision should stand.
8
 
A reviewing court cannot correct a potential error “if the basis for 
the appellant’s assertion of error is not before the court.”
9
 Therefore, a 
complete record is necessary, and typically an appellate court must not 
consult matters outside of the record.
10
 
                                                 
7
 Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Economic Substance and the Standard of 
Review, 60 ALA. L. REV. 339, 341 (2009). 
8




 Brenda C. See, Written in Stone? The Record on Appeal and the Decision-
Making Process, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 157, 160 (2004–2005). 
3
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The record first began to be used in the Court of England during 
Henry II’s reign.
11
 It was little more than pleadings and documentary 
evidence submitted at trial, and errors were commonplace.
12
 The 
system developed over time, with clerks taking over the 
responsibilities for the record, and by the mid-1600s, the clerk of 
assize was a full-time administrative official.
13
 By 1872, every paper 
filed or used in a case became part of the record and was filed away in 
the court archives.
14
 This system subsequently carried over into 
Colonial America and was adapted differently in each state.
15
 
The 1948 codification of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
allowed appellate courts to “permit the original record to be sent as the 
record on appeal.”
16
 In 1960, Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed a 
committee to draft the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; these 




Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a) describes the record on 
appeal as “(1) the original papers and exhibits filed in the district 
court; (2) the transcript of the proceedings, if any; and (3) a certified 
copy of the docket entries prepared by the district clerk.”
18
 When 
reviewing the case, the appellate court is restricted to facts presented 
                                                 
11
 Id. at 161. 
12






 In Massachusetts, pleadings were oral until 1647, and at this point it was 
determined that evidence should be presented in writing, to the great consternation of 
lawyers. Id. at 163–64. In New York, jury trials were very informal and courts also 
acted as the administrative arm of the government. Id. at 164–65. In Pennsylvania, 
attorneys created a “code” for rules of proceeding through a trial—this provided that 
all pleadings be short and in “ordinary and plain character, that they may be 
understood and justice speedily administered.” Id. at 165–66. In the Southern 
Colonies, many judges were not lawyers and did not have training in the law, and the 
systems of recordkeeping and appeal were haphazard. Id. at 166–67.  
16




 FED. R. APP. P. 10(a). 
4
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in the record, and it cannot consider facts which one party could have 
presented to the district court but did not.
19
 If one or both of the parties 
to the case believe that anything pertinent to the proceedings has been 
omitted, or the record is otherwise incorrect, they can either stipulate 
as to what should be done to correct the record or (if they cannot 
agree) the party may file a motion with the trial court to supplement or 
correct the record on appeal.
20
 Where the parties have not acted, it falls 
on the court to supplement the appellate record in a civil case.
21
 
Historically, an appellate court could not go outside the record on 
appeal at all, either in review of the law or the facts.
22
 While the 
English system only recently accepted the custom of reviewing 
supplemental case law and relying on additional legal research outside 
of the record, the American appellate courts have long since departed 
from the harsh rule that they cannot consider additional legal 
precedent in reviewing district court cases.
23
 However, an appellate 
court cannot as easily consider additional facts not in the record, 
because trial courts must “find” facts, and the task of the appellate 
court then becomes to determine whether the trial court properly 
applied the law to the facts it found.
24
 “For a judge to go outside of the 
record in the search for additional facts, or for an advocate to 




While this taboo is still a part of the American legal system, 
appellate courts have routinely considered additional facts and 
independent investigation in certain scenarios.
26
 There are typically a 
                                                 
19
 Hill v. Trustees of Indiana University, 537 F. 2d 248, 254 (7th Cir. 1976). 
20
 See, supra note 10, at 174–75. 
21
 American National Fire Insurance Co. v. Esquire Labs of Arizona, Inc., 694 
P. 2d 800, 808 (Ariz. App. 1984). 
22
 See Jeffrey C. Dobbins, New Evidence on Appeal, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2016 
(2012). 
23
 Frederick Schauer, The Decline of “The Record”: A Comment on Posner, 51 
DUQ. L. REV. 51, 53 (2013). 
24
 Id. at 53–54. 
25
 Id. at 54. 
26
 Id.  
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few different types of facts that appellate courts are able to consider 
outside of the appellate record: (1) Canon Three
27
 and the use of 
disinterested experts; (2) appointment of an Appellate Expert; (3) 
appellate use of judicial notice of adjudicative facts; and (4) the court’s 
determination of certain “legislative facts.”
28
 
Taking the third scenario, Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence allows a court to take judicial notice of certain kinds of 
facts.
29
 Rule 1101 of the Federal Rules of Evidence extends the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to trial courts, bankruptcy courts, and 
courts of appeals.
30
 This means that a court can consider certain facts 
outside of the record, if these facts fall into certain categories: if the 
fact is “generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” 
or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”
31
 These are the sorts of 
facts which a district court would not necessarily find during the trial 
but can very easily ascertained. Common types of facts which courts 
take judicial notice of include: “(1) scientific facts: for instance, does 
the sun rise or set; (2) matters of geography: for instance, what are the 
borders of a state; or (3) matters of political history: for instance, who 
was president in 1958.”
32
  
The Seventh Circuit took judicial notice of the time of sunset on a 
particular day using WeatherSpark, a website which reports the 
weather and other forecast information.
33
 There is a limit to the sorts 
of facts of which a court may take judicial notice. For example, courts 
                                                 
27
 “[J]udge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law 
applicable to the proceeding . . . if the judge (1) gives the parties notice as to whom 
the judge is consulting, (2) reveals the substance of the advice sought, and (3) 
affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond.” See, supra note 10, at 184. 
28
 Id. at 183–90; Schauer, supra note 23, at 56–57. 
29
 FED. R. EVID. 201. 
30
 FED. R. EVID. 1101(a). 
31
 FED. R. EVID. 201. 
32
 Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F. 3d 211, 214 (11th Cir. 1997). 
33
 Owens v. Duncan, 781 F. 3d 360, 362 (7th Cir. 2015). 
6
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can only take judicial notice of adjudicative facts
34
 which are not in 
dispute and which are either common knowledge or are capable of 
certain verification.
35
  The judge’s personal knowledge of the topic is 
not enough because the fact to be put on judicial notice must be 




The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) are in place to control what 
evidence can be introduced in United States courts.
37
 FRE 201 
controls which facts may be taken on judicial notice, and only allows 
adjudicative facts to be taken on judicial notice, not legislative facts.
38
 
Legislative facts are those facts which are not specific to the case-
specific events in the litigation, but are relevant to the law-making 
functions of appellate courts.
39
  
In the seminal case Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall 
concluded “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”
40
 Federal appellate courts may not 
find facts because that is the province of the factfinder (trial judge or 
jury).
41
 Courts have historically interpreted this as appellate courts do 
                                                 
34
 “[A]djudicative facts are those to which the law is applied in the process of 
adjudication. They are the facts that normally go to the jury in a jury case. They 
relate to the parties, their activities, their properties, their businesses.” 2 KENNETH 
CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 353 (1st ed. 1958). 
35
 Alvary v. United States, 302 F. 2d 790, 794 (2d Cir. 1962). 
36
 See, supra note 10, at 193. 
37
 FED. R. EVID. 101. 
38
 FED. R. EVID. 201(a). 
39
 Schauer, supra note 23, at 58; See, supra note 10, at 191 (“‘Legislative’ facts 
concern matters which relate to what is known as the ‘legislative’ function of the 
court, where the court is in essence ‘making law’ either by filling a gap in the 
common law by formulating a rule, construing a statute, or framing a constitutional 
rule.”). 
40
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
41
 E.g., United States v. Bd. of Com’rs of Grady Cnty, Okl., 54 F.2d 593 (10th 
Cir. 1931). 
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not have jurisdiction to make original findings of fact.
42
 However, 
appellate courts are more and more regularly citing to information 
found on the Internet in making their determinations. This article 
explores the expansion of the appellate role as well as the application 
of Internet research. 
 
ROWE V. GIBSON 
 
A.  The Facts 
 
In 2015, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered a case 
in which an Indiana prison inmate named Jeffrey Rowe brought an 
appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
43
 In 2009, Mr. Rowe, while an inmate 
at Pendleton Correctional Facility in Indiana, was diagnosed with 
gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD).
44
 This is a condition where a 
valve-like structure in the esophagus cannot close properly, and the 
contents of the stomach may back up into the esophagus.
45
 The 
symptoms and complications produced by untreated GERD range 
from “persistent, agonizing pain” to esophageal scarring, and the 
increased risk of esophageal cancer.
46
 
The prison physician who diagnosed Mr. Rowe prescribed him the 
medication Zantac, with instructions to take a 150-milligram pill twice 
a day.
47
 After this he was given the pills and permitted to keep them in 
                                                 
42
 E.g., Cross v. Pasley, 267 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1959); Dixie Sand & Gravel 
Corp. v. Holland, 255 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1958); Kistler v. Gingles, 171 F.2d 912 (8th 
Cir. 1949). 
43
 Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F. 3d 622 (7th Cir. 2015). 
44
 Id. at 623. 
45
 Id. (citing Diseases and Conditions: Esophagitis, MAYO CLINIC, 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/esophagitis/basics/definition/con-
20034313 (last visited Jan. 11, 2016)).  
46
 Id. (citing WebMD Answers: What Are the Complications of Long–Term 
GERD?, WEBMD, http://answers.webmd.com/search-
results?ques=What%20Are%20the%20Complications%20of%20Long%20Term%20
GERD? (last visited Jan. 11, 2016)).  
47
 Id. at 624. 
8
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his cell for more than a year.
48
 In January 2011, his pills were 
confiscated, and he was then told that he would be allowed to take a 
pill only when a prison nurse gave it to him, at 9:30 AM and 9:30 
PM.
49
 He complained that he needed to take Zantac with his meals. In 
response, the head of health care at the prison told Rowe that he could 
keep in his cell any Zantac pills that he bought at the commissary, but 
he was unable to keep Zantac given to him by prison staff.
50
 
Unfortunately, Rowe was unable to afford the Zantac in the 




In July 2011, his prescription lapsed, and although he made a 
series of requests for the medication, the nurses denied all of them 
because he had no prescription.
52
 He was told that his chronic 
condition did not warrant the continued use of Zantac, and he would 
have to purchase it from the commissary if he wished to continue 
taking it.
53
 Rowe continued to request Zantac, and on July 13, 2011, a 
physician who worked at the prison (who was not a gastroenterologist) 
reviewed his medical records and noted that his condition did not 
require Zantac at all.
54
 In August, he later relented and prescribed the 
medication once more.
55
 Rowe could still only take it at 9:30 AM and 
9:30 PM, “both times being distant from his meals.”
56
 
In an affidavit, the physician stated that “it does not matter what 
time of day Mr. Rowe receives his Zantac prescription. Each Zantac 
pill is fully effective for twelve hour increments. Zantac does not have 
to be taken before or with a meal to be effective.”
57
 Judge Posner 
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noted that according to the website of the manufacturer of over-the-
counter Zantac, Zantac should be taken “30 to 60 minutes before 
eating food or drinking beverages that cause heartburn.”
58
 Judge 
Posner also noted instructions on the Mayo Clinic website that indicate 




Rowe claimed that he was in pain for five and a half hours after 
eating, and that “he experienced pain for that length of time when he 




B.  District Court Opinion 
 
Rowe subsequently brought a pro se § 1983 cause of action in the 
Southern District of Indiana in April 2014.
61
 Defendants filed a motion 
for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint, which the 
district court granted, finding that Rowe did not come forward with a 
genuine issue of material fact for either his medical care claims or 
retaliation claims.
62
 The defendants’ motion for summary judgment 
was unopposed because Rowe did not respond to the motion; by not 
responding, the district court noted that “plaintiff has conceded the 








                                                 
58
 Id. (quoting Maximum Strength Zantac 150, ZANTAC, 







 Rowe v. Vaisvilas, No. 1:11-cv-00975-SEB-DKL, 2014 WL 1631636 (N. D. 
Ill. April 22, 2014) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded by Rowe v. Gibson 
798 F. 3d 622 (7th Cir. 2015). 
62
 Id. at *3. 
63
 Id. at *1. 
10
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 2
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol11/iss1/2




C.  Appeal to Seventh Circuit 
 
This case was appealed to the Seventh Circuit, and was heard by a 
panel consisting of Judges Posner, Rovner, and Hamilton.
64
 At issue 
for the court was whether the motion for summary judgment was 
properly granted by the district court.
65
 Judge Posner, writing the 
majority opinion, ruled that while the district court properly granted 
summary judgment with respect to most of the claims, the district 
court was incorrect in granting summary judgment with regard to the 
restriction of the time frame to take Zantac, which caused appellant 




1.  Judge Posner’s Majority Opinion 
 
Judge Posner found a genuine issue of material fact in a rather 
unusual manner: he consulted Internet sources such as the Mayo 
Clinic, Healthline, and the Physicians’ Desk Reference.
67
 Judge Posner 
noted his skepticism of Dr. Wolfe, the expert witness provided by the 
defense. He noted that this physician had several suspicious qualities, 
which he felt diminished the quality of his testimony, these included: 
the fact that Dr. Wolfe was employed by Cortizon, but worked at the 
prison; the fact that he was a specialist in preventative medicine;
68
 and 
the fact that Dr. Wolfe is a frequent defendant in prisoner civil rights 
cases.
69
 Judge Posner expressed his skepticism of this expert witness 




                                                 
64




 Id. at 631–32. 
67
 Id. at 626. 
68
 Judge Posner also found this information online at Dr. Wolfe’s profile on a 
website called Healthgrades at www.healthgrades.com/physician/dr-william-wolfe-
2fgkl/background-check. 
69
 Rowe, 798 F.3d at 625. 
70
 Id.  
11
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As Mr. Rowe was a pro se litigant, he did not have the resources 
to effectively rebut Dr. Wolfe’s expert testimony.
71
 Because he could 
not rebut such expert testimony, his case was dismissed under 
summary judgment at the district court.
72
 Judge Posner, at the 
appellate level, came to Mr. Rowe’s aid by doing his own independent 
factual research. 
First, Judge Posner considered the Zantac website, where he noted 
that the instructions available to the public (also on the labels of the 
boxes in which over-the-counter Zantac is sold) indicated that in order 
to prevent symptoms the medicine should be taken “30 to 60 minutes 
before eating food or drinking beverages that cause heartburn.”
73
 
Judge Posner also consulted the Mayo Clinic website
74
 which noted 
that for “adults and teenagers–150 mg with water taken thirty to sixty 
minutes before eating a meal or drinking beverages you expect to 




He next examined the nature of stomach acid, “‘[t]he foods you 
eat affect the amount of acid your stomach produces,’ and ‘many 
people with GERD find that certain foods trigger their symptoms.’”
76
 
He noted that this understanding of stomach acid will give us a full 
picture of the symptoms that Rowe was experiencing in order to find a 
genuine issue of material fact.
77
 
From there, he moved on to the Physician’s Desk Reference, 
which stated that 
                                                 
71
 Id. at 629. 
72
 See id. 
73
 Id. at 625 (quoting Maximum Strength Zantac 150, ZANTAC 
https://www.zantacotc.com/zantac-maximum-strength.html).  
74
 Histamine H2 Antagonist, MAYO CLINIC, www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-
supplements/histamine-h2-antagonist-oralroute-injection-route-intravenous-
route/proper-use/drg-20068584 (last visited Jan. 11, 2016). 
75
 Rowe, 798 F.3d at 626 (emphasis in original). 
76
 Id. (quoting Acid Reflux Diet and Nutrition Guide: Diet and Nutrition for 
GERD, HEALTHLINE, http://www.healthline.com/health/gerd/diet-




Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 2
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol11/iss1/2





[A] 150-mg dose of Zantac inhibits 79 percent of food-
stimulated acid secretion for up to three hours after it’s taken. 
This implies that the drug’s efficacy decreases over time and 
so supports Rowe’s claim that a 150-mg dose does not 
suppress his food stimulated acid secretions when taken six 




Judge Posner stated that all of these references are evidence that 
Rowe was in pain for five-and-a-half hours after eating his meals, and 
that he experienced the pain for that length of time when he was not 
allowed to take Zantac with his meals.
79
 Judge Posner noted that for 
the purposes of summary judgment, “his attestations of extreme pain 
must be credited.”
80
 Noting once again that he believed Dr. Wolfe was 
not a credible witness because he is not a gastroenterologist, never 
truly examined Rowe, and gave no basis for his “off-the-cuff medical 
opinion,” Judge Posner commented that a court should not admit 




Partly by citing to “highly reputable medical websites,”
82
 Judge 
Posner ruled that summary judgment was improper because there was 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was in pain, 
and thus reversed the particular motion.
83
  
In part responding to the dissenting Judge’s criticisms,
84
 Judge 
Posner elaborated at length about the propriety of his Internet research 
for these particular circumstances, including a lengthy appendix where 
he addressed each of the dissent’s individual concerns about his 
                                                 
78




 Id.  
81
 Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)). 
82




 See id. at 635–44 (Hamilton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
13
Martin: "Googling" Your Way to Justice: How Judge Posner Was (Almost) Cor
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015






 In particular, Judge Posner discussed the peculiar 
circumstances of this case: the plaintiff is a pro se litigant, who is 
unable to afford his own expert and is unsuited to properly refute the 
defendants’ own expert testimony, and the expert witness provided by 
the defense is suspect for various reasons detailed above.
86
  
Interestingly, Judge Posner defended his use of Internet research 
by using a “legal realist” approach.
87
 Judge Posner’s understanding of 
legal realism is defined as a school of thought about judicial decision-
making where the judge renders his opinion by considering the 
“plasticity of the American judicial system” in making decisions and 
“wants to do what he can to improve the system.”
88
 This philosophy is 
often contrasted with legal formalism, which Judge Posner describes 
as a judge’s adherence to set rules and principles in deciding cases, in 
place so the judge does not have to (and in fact resists the temptation 




In deciding Rowe, Judge Posner looked closely at the plaintiff’s 
situation as well as the reasoning why an appellate judge should look 
outside of the record in making his determinations.
90
 Judge Posner 
commented that “[i]t is heartless to make a fetish of adversary 
procedure if by doing so feeble evidence is credited because the 
opponent has no practical access to offsetting evidence.”
91
 He noted 
that it would be unfair to the plaintiff to lose this case on summary 
judgment just because he lacks the wherewithal to contest the 




                                                 
85




 See Richard A. Posner, Judicial Opinions and Appellate Advocacy in 
Federal Courts—One Judge’s Views, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 3 (2013). 
88
 Id. at 9. 
89
 Id. at 7. 
90
 Rowe, 798 F.3d at 631–32. 
91
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While Judge Posner noted that the vast majority of the decision 
was based upon Rowe’s own declarations and the timeline of his 
inability to obtain Zantac, he supplemented the record with “cautious, 
limited Internet research that [the Court has] conducted in default of 
the parties’ having done so.”
93
 Judge Posner seemed to be taking a 
stand with this decision vis-à-vis “parity between the adversaries.”
94
 
Because the plaintiff was a pro se litigant with very few resources 
available to him (one of the main reasons why Rowe suffered for so 
long was because he was unable to afford Zantac from the prison 
commissary) and the fact that his claim was not frivolous (he was in 
serious pain for quite some time, necessitating this § 1983 action), 
Judge Posner suggested that the district court judge should recruit a 
lawyer to represent Rowe as well as appoint a “neutral expert witness, 
authorized by Fed. R. Evid. 706” to address the issues in this case.
95
 
Judge Posner’s use of Internet research seemed to act as a stop-gap, 
keeping the case alive for future litigation.
96
 His decision seemed to be 




Judge Posner ended with a critique of the health care system in 
American prisons, and noted that this case is a perfect illustration of 
these problems, thereby emphasizing his notion of the importance of 








                                                 
93
 Id. at 630. 
94




 See id. 
97
 See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the 
Issue? (University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 320, 
2010). 
98
 Rowe, 798 F.3d at 632. 
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2.  Judge Rovner’s Concurrence 
 
Judge Rovner added a concurrence to this decision.
99
 She noted 
that is a relatively simple case that has been hijacked “into a debate 
over the propriety of appellate courts supplementing the record with 
Internet research.”
100
 She clearly believed that this case didn’t need to 
depart from the record at all because Rowe has consistently 
complained of “hours of severe pain” when not taking his medication 
with his meals, and because of the stage of the proceedings, the court 
must give Rowe the “benefit of all conflicts and draw all reasonable 
inferences in his favor as the nonmoving party.”
101
 She noted that Dr. 
Wolfe’s status as a defendant is an example of his self-interest and 
Rowe’s claims of persistent pain was sufficient to discredit his 
testimony at the summary judgment stage.
102
 Judge Rovner noted that 
the information found on Zantac’s website and other “reputable 
medical web sites” only bolsters the plausibility of the existence of a 
factual dispute, and this extra-record information is not necessary to 
the outcome at all.
103
 Judge Rovner stood as a reasonable middle 
ground between Judge Posner’s legal realism approach and Judge 





3.  Judge Hamilton’s Dissent 
 
Judge Hamilton concurred in part and vigorously dissented in 
part.
105
 He concurred with the court’s disposition affirming summary 
judgment for defendants on most of the claims.
106
 Judge Hamilton 
                                                 
99
 Id. at 635 (Rovner, J., concurring). 
100








 See id. 
105
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vigorously dissented to the reversal of summary judgment on Rowe’s 
last claim regarding the timing of the administration of Zantac 
between January and July of 2011 and after August 2011.
107
 Like 
Judge Posner’s legal realism arguments in the majority, Judge 
Hamilton tracked closely with a more formalistic approach to the role 
of an appellate court.
108
  
His criticisms focused on the Internet research which the majority 
used “to contradict the only expert evidence actually in the summary 
judgment record” and to find a genuine issue of material fact sufficient 
to reverse summary judgment.
109
 Judge Hamilton’s grievance was that 
the majority’s inclusion of this extra-record evidence ran “contrary to 
long-established law and raises a host of practical problems the 
majority fails to address.”
110
 
First, Judge Hamilton analyzed the facts in the record to show that 
the majority based its decision primarily on its Internet research.
111
 
Judge Hamilton noted that the evidence in the record showed that the 
plaintiff believed that the prison schedule only allowing him to take 
the Zantac medication at particular times caused him unnecessary pain 
and that the prison physician, Dr. Wolfe, testified that in his 
professional opinion it did not matter what time of day the plaintiff 
took the medication.
112
 In Judge Hamilton’s opinion, the prison staff 
treated the prisoner’s disease appropriately, and the evidence did not 
support a reasonable inference of deliberate indifference.
113
 Judge 
Hamilton disagreed with the majority’s approach to this question 
because (despite its protests) the majority based its decision primarily 
on its independent Internet research.
114
 Without the Internet research, 
the plaintiff did not make enough of a case to avoid summary 
                                                 
107
 Id. at 636. 
108
 See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 96. 
109
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judgment because the evidence in the case did not point to deliberate 
indifference on the part of the medical personnel at the prison.
115
 
Judge Hamilton noted that as the average age of the prison increases, 
so too will the number of cases like this, with prisoners complaining of 
chronic pain.
116
 “The fact that a treatment for pain is not as effective as 
the prisoner would like should not be enough to support an inference 
that the prison staff are deliberately indifferent to his pain.”
117
 Only by 
relying upon independent factual research did the majority make its 
case that the course of treatment was “so clearly inadequate as to 
amount to deliberate indifference.”
118
 
Next, Judge Hamilton discussed the federal law concerning the 
court’s factual research outside the record.
119
 He noted that the ease of 
Internet research has created a new temptation for judges to engage in 
factual extra-record fact-finding.
120
 He distinguished between using 
“careful research to provide context and background information to 
make court decisions understandable” and using independent factual 
research to find a genuine issue of material fact, as is the case here.
121
 
According to him, an appellate court must simply not use independent 
factual research to make its decision.
122
 
Judge Hamilton provided a string of precedents which are 
contrary to the majority opinion’s use of independent factual 
research.
123
 He also stressed that this extra-record fact-finding runs 
contrary to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 and the law of judicial 
notice.
124
 The majority of facts considered by courts when deciding 
cases are the product of the adversarial procedure between opposing 


















 Id.  
124
 Id. at 639. 
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 Judge Hamilton noted that “[t]he foundation of our legal 
system is a confidence that the adversarial procedures will test shaky 
or questionable evidence.”
126
 When a court bases its decisions on its 
own factual research that confidence in the system is lessened.
127
  
Judge Hamilton also criticized the majority’s interpretation of the 
exception of judicial notice.
128
 “Judicial notice ‘substitutes the 
acceptance of a universal truth for the conventional method of 
introducing evidence,’ and as a result, courts must use caution and 
‘strictly adhere’ to the rule before taking judicial notice of pertinent 
facts.”
129
 According to Judge Hamilton, proper timing of Zantac 
medication for maximum efficiency is not “generally known within 
the trial court’s jurisdiction” and it cannot be readily determined from 




The majority has therefore impermissibly created a new category, 
between judicial notice and evidence presented by the adversarial 
process.
131
 This sort of evidence is impermissible under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, and the majority cited no authority to support its 
creation of this new category.
132
 Hamilton was also not swayed by the 
majority’s noting that law clerks and judges routinely engage in 
research outside of the record for deciding cases—this research has 
always been understood to be legal in nature, and independent factual 
research crosses a line.
133
  
Judge Hamilton’s third point was where his dissent developed a 
real bite. Next, he considered the practical problems with the 










 Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 
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 Judge Hamilton did concede that the majority 
was correct in its assessment of the judicial system with regard to pro 
se litigants and most especially with those pro se litigants who are 
prisoners bringing claims of deliberate indifference.
135
 He agreed that 
this is where the judicial system is least reliable because few prisoners 
have access to attorneys and medical experts to address these issues.
136
 
However, he disagreed with the measures that Judge Posner took in 
the majority opinion because of the profound consequences that such 
measures would have on the entire judicial system.
137
 
Plainly speaking, a judge (according to Hamilton) must not 
advocate for one side, and the majority opinion crossed this line.
138
 
Also, the majority offered this new take on the judge’s role, but it 
offered no guidance on how to implement it and what standards should 
apply—“[u]nder the majority’s approach, the factual record will never 
be truly closed.”
139
 This will inevitably create an incredibly expansive 
record and undue litigation regarding what information “should have 
been considered.”
140
 This leads to the question of how much 
independent factual research must judges do and when is it enough?
141
  
Judge Hamilton also contended that the majority’s solution to 
have district courts appoint attorneys and expert witnesses for pro se 
litigants is untenable, and it is similarly not fair to pass the costs of 
these attorneys and experts to the defendants.
142
 There are also 
practical problems when the case goes to trial—how does a judge 
present this new factual information to a jury?
143
 The parties will also 
need to anticipate what evidence the judge will introduce on top of 




 Id. at 640–41. 
136














 Id. at 642. 
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anticipating what each side will argue, which creates an additional 
burden on both sides in the litigation.
144
 
Judge Hamilton was concerned about the judge’s role with 
Internet research, especially that “[t]he internet is an extraordinary 
resource, but it cannot turn judges into competent substitutes for 
experts or scholars such as historians, engineers, chemists, 
psychologists, or physicians.”
145
 By introducing Internet research, the 




Lastly, Judge Hamilton considered the question of the reliability 
of the Internet research in question.
147
 He noted that the websites 
relied upon by the majority contain many “important disclaimers that 
emphasize the need for filtering their information through qualified 
medical advice, which no member of this court is qualified to 
provide.”
148
 Also, the content of the websites did not clearly support 
the majority’s views that Dr. Wolfe’s testimony about the timing of 
Zantac was so wrong that a jury could infer that prison staff were 
deliberately indifferent to Rowe’s health needs.
149
 The websites also 
indicated that those patients with a chronic condition should consult a 
physician regarding appropriate dosage.
150
 Some of the sources did not 
indicate at all about the necessity of taking the pills with meals.
151
 
Judge Hamilton concluded that the majority’s use of the Internet 
research “is not a reliable substitute for proper evidence subjected to 
adversarial scrutiny.”
152
 He found no basis for the majority’s harsh 
criticism of Dr. Wolfe, especially because he has been given no 
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opportunity to respond or explain his views.
153
 “In the end, whether 
Dr. Wolfe’s testimony about the timing of Rowe’s doses was right or 
wrong in some pure and objective sense, or in a case tried with ample 
resources and talent on both sides, is not a question for us.”
154
 Dr. 
Wolfe’s testimony was undisputed, and therefore this court should not 
reverse based on its own untested factual research.
155
 This went well 




CRAFTING A TEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF INTERNET FACTS IN PRO SE 
CASES 
 
A.  Appellate Courts’ current considerations of information outside of 
the record. 
 
Appellate Courts already consider facts outside of the Record in 
certain circumstances. Appellate courts consider “social” or 
“legislative” facts often in considering specific cases, most commonly 
constitutional cases.
157
 The Supreme Court is particularly guilty of 
such practices and has a long history of considering outside 
“legislative” facts in coming to its conclusions.
158
 Courts and 
commentators consider “legislative” facts to be outside the purview of 
Rule 201, and, therefore, they consider a wider variety of “legislative 
facts” in reaching determinations.
159
 










 See Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record 
Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1 (2011). 
158
 Id. at 27. 
159
 FED. R. EVID. 201(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6); Caitlin E. Borgmann, 
Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights Cases, 101 CAL. L. REV. 
1185, 1191 (2013). 
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The Supreme Court has ruled on many cases where the Court 
considered outside legislative facts in reaching its determinations.
160
 
The notion of judicial notice itself allows any court to use case-
specific facts without proof from the parties.
161
 Appellate courts do 
frequently take judicial notice of both legislative and adjudicative 
facts, often on their own initiative.
162
 As a general rule, appellate 
courts are hesitant to take notice of facts which were available to the 
moving party but were not raised at the trial level.
163
 Judge Posner 
himself called this practice “sandbagging” and criticized sophisticated 
parties for gaming the system in such a way.
164
 It is worth noting here 
that Judge Posner’s criticisms are focused upon a litigant knowingly 
withholding evidence and then asking the appellate court to take 
judicial notice of it.
165
 Judge Posner does not address the situation of 
an unsophisticated litigant failing to address certain facts in his brief to 
the district court. The unsophisticated litigant most likely lacks the 
requisite intent to game the system in such a manner. 
Appellate Courts can also consider facts raised for the first time in 
amicus curiae briefs. An amicus curiae brief is filed by an amicus,
166
 a 
non-party to the case, who offers information that bears on the case, 
but has not been solicited by any of the parties. It is proper for amici to 
provide non-record facts that broadly and generally address the issues 
                                                 
160
 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008), Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–94 (1954). 
161
 29 AM. JUR. 2D, EVIDENCE § 24 (2013). 
162
 See, e.g., Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 100 of New York, N.Y. 
& Vicinity, AFL-CIO v. City of New York Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 
534, 540 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Indian Palms Assoc. Ltd., 61 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 
1995). 
163
 Zell v. Jacoby-Bender Inc., 542 F.2d 34, 38 (7th Cir. 1976). 
164
 Tamari v. Bache & Co., 838 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1988). 
165
 “A litigant cannot put in part of his case in the trial court and then, if he 
loses, put in the rest on appeal.” Id. 
166
 “friend of the court” 
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 These cases often involve greater constitutional 
implications, and thus they draw the eye of public policy groups and 
governmental organizations with specialized knowledge of the 
background of the case.
168
 Many watershed Supreme Court decisions 
ruling on constitutional protections have used new facts in amicus 
briefs as justification for their decisions. Brown v. Board of Education 
is one example of the Court relying on sociological research presented 
to the Court by way of an amicus brief.
169
 
Appellate courts consider facts outside the record in other areas as 
well. The Seventh Circuit has previously allowed plaintiffs appealing 
the dismissal of their complaints to provide the appellate court with 
non-record evidence, explaining how the plaintiffs might prove the 
dismissed claim if allowed to go forward.
170
  
How is allowing certain Internet research different from the 
notions of judicial notice or the inclusion of amicus briefs? If 
developed with standards requiring the judge to give notice to the 
parties and allow them opportunity to respond, independent limited 
research by an appellate judge should be no different than an appellate 






                                                 
167
 Sylvia H. Walbot & Joseph H. Lang, Jr., Amicus Briefs: Friend or Foe of 
Florida Courts?, 32 STETSON L. REV. 269, 291 (2003). 
168
 Paul M. Collins, Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus 
Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC. REV. 807 
(2004). 
169
 In Brown, the Court relied upon sociological research presented by the 
ACLU which detailed studies that concluded that segregation upon the basis of race 
has a detrimental effect upon schoolchildren. 347 U.S. 483, 493–94 (1954); Brief on 
Behalf of American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae, Supporting Appellants, 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 482 (1954) 1952 WL 82040. 
170
 See Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002); Dawson v. 
General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1992); Orthmann v. Apple River 
Campground, Inc., 757 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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B.  More Liberal Construction of Pleadings for Pro Se Litigants 
 
A common trend in Supreme Court and appellate jurisprudence is 
the special effort courts put forth to liberally interpret pro se briefs to 
avoid dismissing or denying relief to pro se litigants. The Supreme 
Court decisions in Conley v. Gibson and Haines v. Kerner are seminal 
in the development of the rule for liberal construction of pro se 
complaints.
171
 Both cases advance the notion that pro se pleadings are 




Different jurisdictions apply this concept in different ways 
concerning appellate briefs. Some jurisdictions take the approach that 
pro se litigants should be treated exactly the same as parties who are 
represented by lawyers in filing their appellate briefs.
173
 Others are 
more lax about appellate pro se pleading requirements and find that 
liberal construction of pro se appellate briefs is appropriate.
174
 Several 
jurisdictions, including the Seventh Circuit, have conflicting binding 
precedent on when a court may liberally construe pro se appellate 
briefs.
175
 Only one jurisdiction applies a factored-approach rather than 
uniform per se rules of liberal construction.
176
 The Third Circuit 
considers “pro se liberality as a discretionary tool available to 
judges.”
177
 A litigant’s pro se status is a single factor in how liberally 
the court shall interpret their pleadings.
178
 
                                                 
171
 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 
(1972). 
172
 Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. 
173
 These jurisdictions are the First, Fourth, Eighth and D.C. Circuits. Correll, 
supra note 2, at 876–79. 
174
 These jurisdictions are the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. Id. 
at 879–83. 
175
 These jurisdictions are the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits. Id. at 884–85. 
176
 This jurisdiction is the Third Circuit. Id. at 883–84. 
177
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The issue of waiver becomes important in cases where an 
appellate court construes pro se briefs liberally.
179
 The general rule is 
that an appellate court will not consider an argument raised for the first 
time on appeal, and will consider that argument “waived” because it is 
not in the pleadings from the trial court. Appellate discretion in liberal 
construction of appellate briefs implicates the notion of waiver 
because a court can interpret vague pleadings from pro se litigants in a 
way that avoids waiver of issues.
180
 
The Supreme Court’s ultimate goal in advancing the argument of 
liberal interpretation of pro se briefs was to create a way for pro se 
litigants to have better access to the courts.
181
 The Supreme Court is 
primarily interested in preventing pro se litigants from becoming a 
separate, underrepresented class in court.
182
 A court weighing the 
notion of equal protection against a “helping hand” for pro se litigants 
often tips the scale in favor of the helping hand.
183
  
Pro se litigants are not merely the beleaguered and downtrodden. 
Many attorneys also represent themselves pro se and other pro se 
                                                 
179
 Id. at 864–65. 
180
 Id. at 880 (quoting Audler v. CBC Innovis, Inc., 519 F.3d 239, 255 (5th Cir. 
2008) (“[P]ro se litigants’ briefs are liberally construed so as to avoid waiver of 
issues[;] the indulgence for parties represented by counsel is necessarily narrower.”). 
181
 Id. at 889. Correll notes that “[t]here is no meaningful distinction between a 
rule which would deny the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and 
one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance.” Id. (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956)). 
182
 Id. at 890. “[O]nce established, [appellate] avenues must be kept free of 
unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts.” 
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966). 
183
 Correll, supra note 2, at 891–92; see also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 
(2011). In Turner, the Supreme Court reversed a civil contempt order for a pro se 
litigant because the trial court’s failure to provide procedural safeguards constituted 
a violation of the litigant’s due process rights. The fact that the litigant was pro se 
informed the Court’s view of due process. Turner’s obligations might lead courts to 
assure “fundamental fairness” through procedural safeguards, making the courts 
more open and accessible. Id. at 2519–20. 
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litigants are similarly educated and wealthy.
184
 Correll considered this 
idea when developing a solution regarding pro se briefings and adopts 
the Third Circuit’s approach of using a factor-based system to 
determine liberality of appellate pleadings.
185
 Pro se status acts as a 
trigger, and a court should also consider “material in the record 
regarding a pro se litigant’s education, reasons for proceeding without 
counsel, and success in presenting his arguments up to that point.”
186
 
These factors would allow courts to ensure that pro se litigants are 
able to advance their arguments without concern for potential waiver 
due to lack of knowledge. Correll also indicates that this approach 
could also solve the problem of “poor briefing by counsel” and similar 




The Supreme Court has already advanced this argument that pro 
se litigants should be offered the benefit of the doubt in the form of 
liberal construction of pleadings. Some jurisdictions allow pro se 
litigants a chance to be heard on the merits without worrying about 
accidental waiver of their arguments. Similarly, the use of judicial 
notice and Internet research should be used by appellate courts in 
similar situations. If a pro se appellant has improperly developed the 
record on the trial level and the court feels that it can take judicial 
notice of such information, then it is proper for an appellate court to do 
so.  This should be limited to the situations where pro se pleadings are 
to be interpreted liberally. 
 
C.  Judicial Notice and the Internet 
 
Another area of growing concern for both trial and appellate 
courts is the increasing use of Internet research in the courtroom. 
Courts are beginning to take judicial notice of facts found on the 
Internet with increasing regularity. Many cases at both the trial and 
                                                 
184
 Correll, supra note 2, at 870–72. 
185




 Id. at 897–98. 
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Jeffrey Bellin and Andrew Guthrie Ferguson note this growing 
trend in their article, and specifically note that the ease of Internet 
research can create an incentive for judges and jurors to search for 
information on the Internet rather than simply rely upon the 
information provided by the parties.
189
 By allowing a court to take 
judicial notice of information found online, we can limit the urge for 
the fact-finders to impermissibly search the Internet for their answers 
to how to interpret a case.
190
 An appellate court could take judicial 
notice of such Internet facts in the same manner as it takes judicial 
notice of other adjudicative facts. 
Bellin and Ferguson crafted a test on the admissibility standards 
for information discovered using the Internet. This test adopts Rule 
201 so a court may properly determine the reliability of Internet 
sources in taking judicial notice of such information.
191
 Their test 
takes into account three attributes of the online source: “(1) knowledge 
of the subject matter, (2) independence from relevant bias, and (3) 
incentive to ensure accuracy.”
192
 By meeting these three criteria, 
information found online can be deemed to be sufficiently accurate to 




                                                 
188
 See, e.g., Laborer’s Pension Fund v. Blackmore Sewer Constr., Inc., 298 
F.3d 600, 607 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1266 n.9 
(11th Cir. 2000); Levan v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 190 F.3d 1230, 1235 n.12 (11th 
Cir. 1999). 
189
 Jeffrey Bellin & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Trial by Google: Judicial 








 For example, websites maintained by government agencies contain 
seemingly accurate information due to the expertise of the agencies with regard to 
the subject matter, lack of bias due to governmental standards, and incentives to 
ensure the accuracy of the posted information. See id. at 1168–70. The authors also 
note that even if a source could be biased, such as crime statistics from New York 
City Police Department (who has an incentive to skew these statistics to show less 
28
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If an appellate court is able to take judicial notice of certain 
adjudicative facts sua sponte, then the court should also be able to take 
judicial notice of information found on the Internet in the same 
manner. A concern that appellate courts have about taking judicial 
notice relates to the “sandbagging” notion; appellate courts are 
reluctant to take notice of facts that a party could have raised in the 
trial court.
194
 This is not an issue in cases where pro se litigants are 
appealing their cases with insufficiently pled facts. In these cases, this 
is not a tactic, but rather it is an example of the litigant’s lack of 
knowledge about the proper facts to allege. Like an appellate court 
liberally interpreting the pro se litigant’s pleadings to avoid waiver of 
issues on appeal, an appellate court could also conduct a limited 
investigation into Internet research under this expanded notion of 
judicial notice.  
 
D.  Judicial Notice of Internet Facts in Pro Se Appeals: A Test 
 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that appellate pleadings 
submitted by pro se litigants should be interpreted leniently to avoid 
waiver of arguments because pro se litigants are in danger of having 
their cases dismissed due to procedural flaws.
195
 The same sort of 
procedure should apply to appellate discretion in taking judicial notice 
of information found on the Internet so that pro se appellants do not 
waive arguments based on facts which were insufficiently pled. 
By combining the Correll standard for judicial leniency for pro se 
appellants and the Bellin and Fergson standard for appellate judicial 
notice of Internet facts, we can give further effect to the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning for assisting pro se litigants. Ideally, the litigants 
should be able to advance their own arguments using assistance from 
                                                                                                                   
crime), if the bias cuts against the fact to be established (e.g. if a public defender 
uses this information to show the prevalence of crime in the area) then the bias does 
not undermine the evidentiary value of the information. Id. at 1170. 
194
 See Tamari v. Bache & Co., 838 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1988). 
195
 Correll, supra note 2, at 895–96. 
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legal aid providers, court-appointed counsel, and online education.
196
 
These measures are often expensive or impractical as far as resources 
currently available to pro se litigants. The appellate court’s use of 
limited Internet research can serve as a measure to ensure that these 
pro se litigants do not lose their arguments due to a procedural pitfall. 
First, we must establish whether the party is pro se or similarly 
situated. By looking to factors that Correll considered, we can 
determine whether judicial leniency is even necessary. The Third 
Circuit treats pro se status as one “flag” in deciding whether to 
exercise discretionary waiver rules.
197
 Other important factors which 
can be considered are the litigant’s education, reasons for proceeding 
without counsel, and success in presenting his arguments up to that 
point.
198
 This approach could therefore also work for indigent clients 
who are represented by incompetent counsel.
199
 
Next, we should determine whether judicial notice of Internet 
facts would be useful to assist courts in liberally interpreting a pro se 
litigant’s pleadings. In a situation where a pro se litigant attempts to 
state a claim but has inartfully pled his case, or has only included 
conclusory statements rather than specific material facts, an appellate 
court should take judicial notice of facts in certain Internet sources. 
The purpose of lowered pleading standards for pro se litigants is to 
allow a court the opportunity to hear their cases on the merits, rather 
than allow the claims to be dismissed because they are inartfully 
pled.
200
 While a ruling on summary judgment is a decision on the 
merits of the case, a pro se litigant could unintentionally doom his own 
case by failing to allege facts correctly or relying on conclusory 
                                                 
196
 Shon R. Hopwood, Slicing Through the Great Legal Gordian Knot: Ways 
to Assist Pro Se Litigants in Their Quest for Justice, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1229, 
1235–38 (2011). 
197
 Correll, supra note 2, at 897; see United States v. Contents of Two 
Shipping Containers Seized at Elizabeth, 113 F. App’x 460, 462 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“Pro se status by no means creates an automatic exception to the waiver rule, but we 
have relied on this factor to relax the waiver rule in the past.”). 
198
 Correll, supra note 2, at 897. 
199
 Id. at 897–98. 
200
 Id. at 885–93. 
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statements, especially in cases that require specialized knowledge. In 
addition to reading the pleadings liberally, if a litigant fails to rebut 
expert testimony effectively, a court should consider careful Internet 
research as a way to counter an opposing expert’s testimony and give 
effect to the Supreme Court’s concern that pro se litigants be able to 
fully try their cases. At the early stage in the proceedings, this Internet 
research could also give a pro se litigant the benefit of the doubt, and 
provide him with more resources should his case go to trial. 
Next, the court should consider the nature of the Internet source 
and whether the evidence can be judicially noticed. The Bellin and 
Ferguson standard for judicial notice of Internet information should be 
used.
201
 The information should be of a type where an online source 
consulted is knowledgeable about the subject matter, is independent 
from relevant bias, and has incentive to be accurate.
202
 There is much 
information on the Internet which could be helpful to a pro se litigant’s 
case. Especially if the information is more technical, or requires an 
expert, a free source likely exists on the Internet. These standards will 
help narrow what sources are appropriate to consult for these facts and 
which ones are not. 
Lastly, the court should consider specific examples of sources 
which might be accurate and reputable enough to satisfy the judicial 
notice requirement. For statistical information, many government 
websites such as websites maintained by the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration or Bureau of Justice Statistics fit these 
standards.
203
 For medical information, WebMD is a source that is 
maintained and edited by experts, making it an easily accessible and 
accurate source under FRE 201.
204
 Google Maps provides an 
extremely accurate mapping system, with Google having a great 
financial incentive to ensure the accuracy of the site.
205
 An Internet 
researcher can find information about the chain of title of a home or its 
                                                 
201




 See id. at 1168. 
204
 See id. 
205
 See id. at 1170. 
31
Martin: "Googling" Your Way to Justice: How Judge Posner Was (Almost) Cor
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015




current PIN number by searching County websites.
206
 The IRS website 
provides free information and resources about filing taxes.
207
 There are 
numerous other resources which pass the test and which courts could 
potentially use to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
 
DID JUDGE POSNER GET IT RIGHT? 
 
To determine whether Judge Posner appropriately took judicial 
notice of this Internet information, a reviewer must evaluate his 
process and which websites he consulted. First, Rowe is a pro se 
prisoner, who expressly attempted to get access to both counsel and a 
medical expert, but his petitions were denied.
208
 It is appropriate for a 
court to exercise judicial discretion in interpreting pleadings and 
taking judicial notice of Internet facts. 
Next, the judge should consider whether taking judicial notice of 
Internet facts is beneficial to the pro se litigant’s case. In Rowe, the 
appellant was appealing from a motion granting summary judgment.
209
 
The district court granted summary judgment in part because Rowe 
did not respond to the motion, thereby conceding defendants’ versions 
of the facts.
210
 The district court also denied Rowe’s motion to appoint 
an expert to explain his medical condition more fully.
211
 These were 
procedural and economic pitfalls, which are the types of inequities the 
Supreme Court is hoping to balance by allowing pro se pleadings to be 
interpreted liberally.
212
 Using the framework advanced in this article, 
Judge Posner properly consulted the Internet for this specific appeal. 
                                                 
206
 See, e.g., Cook County Property Search, COOK CTY. PROP. TAX PORTAL, 
http://www.cookcountypropertyinfo.com/Pages/PIN-Search.aspx (last visited Jan. 
11, 2016). 
207
 IRS, https://www.irs.gov/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).  
208
 Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622, 629–30 (7th Cir. 2015). 
209
 Id. at 623. 
210
 Rowe v. Vaisvilas, No. 1:11-cv-00975-SEB-DKL, 2014 WL 1631636, at *1 
(N. D. Ill. April 22, 2014).  
211
 Rowe, 798 F.3d at 635 (Rovner, J., concurring). 
212
 See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972). 
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Lastly, the court should consider the types of Internet sources 
which were consulted, to determine whether judicial notice is proper. 
Judge Posner considered a variety of websites in making his 







 are all medical websites providing expert advice to the 
masses. These websites are edited by experts in the medical field, and, 
therefore, they are reliable, unbiased, and have an incentive to be 
accurate.
216
 Therefore, Judge Posner could take judicial notice of 
information regarding GERD generally, as well as the effects and 
proper dosing procedures of certain medications. Judge Posner’s 
citation to the Zantac website
217
 is more suspect. The Zantac website is 
maintained by the company which is surely knowledgeable about the 
product it sells, but the company could have incentive for biased 
information to sell more of its product. Judge Posner noted that this is 
not suspect because “the manufacturer would be taking grave risks if it 
misrepresented the properties of its product.”
218
 Still, a corporate 
                                                 
213
 Gastroesophageal reflux disease, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, 
www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000265.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2016). 
214
 Diseases and Conditions, Esophagitis, MAYO CLINIC, 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/esophagitis/basics/definition/con-
20034313; Drugs and Supplements: Histamine H2 Antagonist (Oral Route, Injection 
Route, Intravenous Route), MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-
supplements/histamine-h2-antagonist-oral-route-injection-route-intravenous-
route/proper-use/drg-20068584 (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).  
215
 Complications of Heartburn and GERD, WEBMD, 
http://www.webmd.com/heartburn-gerd/guide/untreated-heartburn (last visited Jan. 
11, 2016).  
216
 See, e.g., Bellin & Ferguson, supra note 189, at 1178 n. 231 (quoting Art 
Chimes, Website of the Week—WebMD, VOICE OF AM., 
http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2008-12-voa20/405489.html/ (Nov. 1, 2009, 
3:37 P.M.) [stating that “everything is reviewed by experts” and quoting the 
WebMD Chief Medical Editor that “every piece of content on our site actually goes 
through a doctor’s eyes. A board-certified physician will look at the content, make 
sure it’s up to date, accurate, and doesn’t have anything misleading that might be 
misconstrued by a lay audience.”]). 
217
 Maximum Strength Zantac 150, ZANTAC, 
https://www.zantacotc.com/zantac-maximum-strength.html# drug-facts.  
218
 Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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website stemming from a business model of selling as much Zantac as 
possible would include more suspect information than websites 
maintained by physicians which discuss the properties of the same 
medication. This information is corroborated, but the Zantac website 
should hold less weight than similar sources from either WebMD or 





 for general information about Zantac as well as a 
background check on the defense’s expert witness.
221
 These websites 
are not maintained and edited by experts and, therefore, their 
information is suspect.
222
 Judge Posner’s use of the information on 
these websites is therefore improper and should have been excluded. 
Moreover, Judge Posner used the Healthgrades information to question 
the witness’ credibility.
223
 This is not an appropriate application of 
judicial notice, and, therefore, it should not be verified using Internet 
research. In the future, if Judge Posner takes judicial notice of 
information found on the Internet, he should restrict his searches to 




The notion that pro se litigants overwhelmingly need a court’s 
assistance is misleading and overbroad. Many pro se litigants are 
                                                 
219
 Ranitidine, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranitidine (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2016).  
220
 HEALTHGRADES, http://www.healthgrades.com/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2016). 
221
 Rowe, 798 F.3d at 624–25. 
222
 Terms of Use, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/terms_of_use (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) 
(“Because the Wikimedia Projects are collaboratively edited, all of the content that 
we host is provided by users like yourself, and we do not take an editorial role. This 
means that we generally do not monitor or edit the content of the Project websites, 
and we do not take any responsibility for this content.”); Ira S. Nash, Web alert: 
Healthgrades, 5 CURRENT CARDIOLOGY REPORTS 92–93 (2003) (“The algorithms 
used to create the scores are proprietary; therefore, it is not possible to ‘score the 
scorecard.’ Many quality experts have expressed concern about the reliability and 
validity of such “black box” rating scales”).  
223
 Rowe, 798 F.3d at 624–25. 
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educated, competent, and make the choice not to use representation.
224
 
Many represented indigent parties seek out counsel who turn out to be 
incompetent.
225
 Applying a standard across the board is the way to 
ensure that a court will always reach the just result. Also, an appellate 
court can maximize the probability that litigants’ claims are not 
dismissed due to procedural flaws by applying judicial notice to liberal 
pleading standards. The system must contain some representation of 
fairness. “Equality before the law, like universal suffrage, holds a 
privileged place in our political system, and to deny equality before 
the law delegitimizes that system . . . when these rights are denied, the 
expectation that the affronted parties should continue to respect the 
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